Reformed Retrieval and the Authority of Scripture: Francis Turretin on the Trinity

In recent decades, the concept of “theological retrieval” has become increasingly important in contemporary Reformed Theology.¹ Within this movement, the doctrine of the Trinity has frequently functioned as a one of the most relevant test cases for assessing continuity between Reformed theology and the catholic tradition.² For instance, Matthew Barrett affirms that: “Reformed scholastics from Patrick Gillespie to Francis Turretin to John Owen retrieved medieval Scholasticism’s Trinitarianism.”³ While that statement is generally true, as Richard Muller has shown, the concept of continuity must always be applied with caution.⁴ The reason is that continuity does not imply a static reproduction, and discontinuity still assumes an ongoing continuum.⁵ Thus, even in the doctrine of the Trinity, the idea of “retrieval” must be established with care and precision. 

This caution is especially important when applying modern labels such as “Augustinian,” “Reformed Thomist,” “Calvinist Thomism,” or “Modified Thomism” to Reformed and post-Reformation theologians.⁶ Although such categories may help identify broad lines of influence, they should not function as controlling paradigms for interpreting their theological development. Reformed authors were not seeking to construct distinctly Augustinian or Thomistic doctrines of the Trinity. Rather, they engaged the broad catholic inheritance as a subordinate witnesses to divine revelation.

In this context, this article aims to contribute to this discussion by examining Francis Turretin’s doctrine of the Trinity in the Institutes of Elenctic Theology.⁷ More specifically, it investigates the complexities and grounds on which Turretin retrieves patristic, Nicene, and medieval sources. My thesis is that Turretin’s doctrine of the Trinity exemplifies a distinctly Reformed pattern of theological retrieval: he receives these traditions as subordinate witnesses to divine revelation, appropriating their doctrinal language and conceptual distinctions when they clarify and defend the biblical doctrine of the Trinity, while rejecting or restricting them when they exceed the bounds of Scripture. This becomes especially evident in his treatment of the psychological analogy, where Turretin is willing to depart from major figures such as Augustine and Aquinas when their formulations move beyond what he regards as the limits of revelation.⁸ In this sense, Turretin’s retrieval is not a mere repetition of the past, but a critical appropriation of the catholic inheritance under the supreme authority of the Word of God.

To advance this argument, the article proceeds in two sections. First, I will examine the general principles that govern Turretin’s theological method in the Institutes. Second, I will show how these principles operate in his doctrine of the Trinity by analyzing his retrieval of patristic, Nicene, and medieval sources, with particular attention to both his positive appropriation of classical Trinitarian grammar and his critical restraint toward speculative accounts of the divine processions.

Francis Turretin and His Theological Method

Francis Turretin was born in Geneva on October 17, 1623.⁹ He came from a family deeply committed to Protestantism.¹⁰ And, like many members of his family, he served as pastor of the Italian Church and professor at the Academy of Geneva.¹¹ His most important work was the Institutes of Elenctic Theology, published between 1679 and 1685.¹² This work, as Mark Beach explains, comprises nearly 1,800 pages in its original Latin and more than 2,050 pages in its English translation.¹³

Thus, given the depth and scope of the Institutes, understanding Turretin’s theological method and the way he retrieves the sources of the past requires examining three essential elements of his work: (1) the purpose, (2) the authority of Scripture in relation to tradition and reason, and (3) his scholastic method.

The Purpose of the Institutes

Turretin’s Trinitarian method cannot be separated from the broader purpose of his work, namely, the defense and preservation of the truth of the Gospel against opposition and unnecessary division.¹⁴ As Cumming notes, the dedication and preface of the Institutes reveal that this purpose can be understood in three interrelated dimensions: political, theological, and disputational. 

First, Turretin begins by affirming that Geneva was the city of God, uniquely blessed by two illustrious gifts of divine grace: religion and liberty.¹⁵ He argues that failing to recognize these blessings would render them “the most ungrateful of mortals.”¹⁶ Consequently, Turretin insists that “nothing should be more important to us than the constant and faithful custody of so great a benefit.”¹⁷ His message to Geneva’s leaders is clear: they must remain faithful to the sacred purpose of upholding the Reformation’s legacy.¹⁸

Second, Turretin declares explicitly that his work was not a mere repetition of the Reformation’s theology.¹⁹ While his objective was to follow in the footsteps of his predecessors, he is doing it “not with the same steps” nor “equal paces.”²⁰ For him, as for the Reformed Orthodox in general, the theological reflection was not merely about repeating the doctrines of the past, but to ensure that the core principles of the Reformation remained relevant and clear in the context of the evolving needs of Protestantism.²¹

Third, Turretin explains that his purpose is primarily disputational. He is not trying to present “a full and accurate system of theology,” but to address the key controversies between the Reformed tradition and its ancient and modern adversaries.²² His goal is to safeguard confessional orthodoxy by defending doctrine with a firm rebuttal of heresy and error.²³

In summary, the purpose of the Institutio was to persuade both Geneva and the broader Reformed tradition that Turretin’s understanding of orthodoxy stood in continuity with the Reformers, and also with the wider catholic tradition of the church.²⁴ Yet this continuity was neither static nor uncritical. Turretin sought to preserve the substance of inherited doctrine, exercising the freedom to adapt its form, emphasis, and mode of expression in order to address the controversies of his own context.

Scripture as the Governing Principle 

Like the Reformers, Turretin regarded Scripture as the norma absoluta—the absolute norm that rules over all other authorities.²⁵ In the preface to the Institutio, Turretin insists that his work does not contain “anything new” or anything that is a “stranger from the Word of God.”²⁶

Scripture’s supremacy, however, did not imply a rejection of theological tradition, as was often the case among opponents of orthodoxy.²⁷ Indeed, Turretin also affirms that his work also contains nothing strange “from the public forms received in our churches.”²⁸ Accordingly, for him—as for Reformed orthodoxy more broadly—theological development remained deeply biblical while also proceeding in conscious dialogue with the past and a broad sense of catholicity.²⁹

This same commitment to Scriptural supremacy also governs Turretin’s understanding of reason and philosophy.³⁰ In particular, Turretin responds to Socinian attempts to grant reason a normative role in theology.³¹ By contrast, orthodoxy asserts that only Scripture should be considered as the primaria norma.³² Reason functions, in its ancillary role, as an instrument of faith with a “ministerial” and “organic role” that provides the tools for properly expressing the knowledge revealed in Scripture.³³

Scripture also “governs over philosophy, with the latter acting as its servant and being subordinate to it.”³⁴ Orthodoxy approaches Scripture as “the deposit of faith” from which correct definitions are derived.³⁵ On this basis, the philosophical exercise of reasoning is neither superior to nor inherently in conflict with Christian theology: subordinata non repugnant.³⁶ Orthodoxy thus proposes a via media: philosophy is neither rejected nor enthroned, but received as a tool of sound reasoning, one that serves to derive logical conclusions and guard against contradiction under the authority of Scripture.³⁷

In this way, Turretin’s theological corpus is shaped by exegetical and theological reasoning grounded in the supremacy of Scripture.³⁸ In employing tradition, reason, and philosophical reasoning to codify and clarify doctrine, Turretin develops a more rigorous and systematic theological expression than that of the early Reformers; nonetheless, such reasoning remains consistently subordinated to divine revelation and the analogy of faith.³⁹

Scholastic Method 

Turretin’s theological formation took place within the broader context of Protestant scholasticism.⁴⁰ He encountered this methodology during his theological training in Europe, where he had the opportunity to study with Gisbert Voetius (1568-1676), Johannes Hoornbeek (1617-1666), and Anna van Schurman (1607-1678)—three prominent theologians known for their expertise in disputation and polemics.⁴¹ Turretin integrates this method into his Institutes, and uses it for confronting Roman Catholic, Socinian, and Remonstrant opponents, with a very organized form of theology.⁴²

Yet Turretin adopted the scholastic method selectively. As Cumming observes, although Turretin employed the scholastic method extensively, he did not primarily identify himself as a scholastic theologian.⁴³ Instead, he saw himself as orthodox, viewing the scholastici as occasional allies of orthodoxy.⁴⁴ This means that they were “not above reproach” and deserved the same criticism as other theologians who strayed from orthodoxy.⁴⁵ Scholasticism was only valuable when it aligned with certain fundamentals and when properly restrained. When scholastics, whether Roman Catholic, Socinian or even medieval, deviated from these fundamentals, their methodology became ineffective.⁴⁶

In sum, this section has outlined the general principles that govern Turretin’s theological method: the elenctic purpose of the Institutes, the supremacy of Scripture, and the ministerial use of reason and scholastic method. These elements show that Turretin’s theology is shaped by a concern to defend Reformed orthodoxy, to preserve continuity with the church’s received forms of doctrine, and to subordinate every theological judgment to the authority of divine revelation. The following section will therefore examine how these principles operate concretely in his doctrine of the Trinity, especially in the way he receives, adapts, and limits earlier theological formulations.

Turretin’s Retrieval of Catholic Tradition in Trinitarian Theology

Turretin’s doctrine of the Trinity occupies a substantial portion of the Institutes of Elenctic Theology, spanning Questions 23–31 of the Third Topic. Within these questions, he addresses the meaning of Trinitarian terminology, the biblical foundations of the doctrine, the distinction of the divine persons, the relations of origin, and the operations of the Trinity. Turretin also engages extensively with Scripture, the Church Fathers, ecumenical councils, medieval theologians, and Reformed tradition, revealing a sophisticated appropriation of the broader catholic tradition.

Thus, in order to understand how Turretin retrieves and employs the theological inheritance of the past, it is necessary to examine three central features of his Trinitarian theology: (1) the priority of Scripture as the governing principle of doctrinal formulation, (2) his retrieval of patristic and Nicene orthodoxy, and (3) his selective appropriation of medieval theological developments.

Priority of Scripture

The first principle governing Turretin’s treatment of the Trinity is the priority of divine revelation. For Turretin, this means that the foundation for establishing the doctrine lies neither in tradition nor in reason, but solely in “the authority of divine revelation.”⁴⁷ Therefore, while he retrieves and actively engages tradition and conciliar decisions, Scripture remains the defining feature of his Trinitarian theology.⁴⁸

This commitment to divine revelation is evident in the prominent role Scripture plays throughout Turretin’s treatment of the Trinity. In this section alone, he includes more than 400 biblical citations, approximately 110 of which are drawn from the Old Testament. Like the Reformed orthodox more broadly, Turretin is deeply committed to approaching Scripture in its original languages and to interpreting it according to its literal, historical, and philological sense.⁴⁹ Accordingly, he draws on the best exegetical resources of his time, including studies of manuscripts, translations, the Septuagint, dictionaries, lexicons, and textual criticism.⁵⁰ As Muller explains, Turretin exemplifies a characteristic seventeenth-century commitment to the development of orthodox “critical tools, technical apparatus, and introductory analyses of the text.”⁵¹

Such exegetical rigor was especially significant given the antitrinitarian challenges of the seventeenth century. In response to Socinian and other antitrinitarian appeals to biblicist exegesis, Reformed theologians had to articulate the doctrine of the Trinity in explicitly biblical terms, engaging in “the intense battle over the exegetical ground of the doctrine in both testaments.”⁵² Turretin’s approach, therefore, is both deeply exegetical and, as we will see next, profoundly rooted in tradition.⁵³

Retrieval of Patristic and Nicene Orthodoxy

Turretin rejects the Papist view that the Church Fathers should serve as “judges in controversies of faith.” Nevertheless, he affirms their significant value for the church.⁵⁴ He notes that the orthodox “hold the fathers in great estimation and think them very useful to a knowledge of the history of the ancient church.”⁵⁵ Although this authority is only “ecclesiastical and subordinate to the Scriptures,” Turretin insists that their writings “must be respectfully received and may be read with profit.”⁵⁶

This appreciation is clearly reflected in Turretin’s doctrine of the Trinity. Throughout his treatment of the subject, he engages extensively with both pre-Nicene and Nicene sources, viewing the Fathers as faithful witnesses to biblical revelation concerning the nature of God.⁵⁷ In this section alone, there are nearly forty references to patristic literature, including citations from Hilary of Poitiers, Augustine, Tertullian, Athanasius, Jerome, Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus, John of Damascus, Justin Martyr, Cyprian, Clement of Rome, Irenaeus, Origen, Eusebius, Theodoret, and Ignatius.⁵⁸ Augustine and Athanasius stand out as the most frequently cited figures. Even so, Turretin does not rely on any one author as his controlling authority but appeals to the Fathers collectively as bearers of the catholic Trinitarian doctrine disclosed in Scripture.

In addition, Turretin draws extensively upon the major creeds and councils of the early church, including the Apostles’ Creed, the Synod of Sardica, the Council of Alexandria, the Council of Nicaea, the Council of Ariminum (Rimini), and the Athanasian Creed.⁵⁹ His appeal to these sources, however, is not limited to their doctrinal content. Turretin also receives and defends the theological grammar through which the church sought to articulate the teaching of Scripture concerning the triune nature of God with greater precision. 

Consequently, he opens his treatment by carefully defining the technical vocabulary inherited from the tradition—terms such as essence, substance, subsistence, hypostasis, person, Trinity, homoousion, and emperichoresis—in dialogue with both the councils and the Fathers.⁶⁰ On this basis, Turretin argues that the church may legitimately employ “unwritten words” in order to express “written doctrines” more clearly and to refute heresy.⁶¹ He explains, “knowing that with the words they might abolish the doctrine also, we therefore did right in retaining them.”⁶²

This language serves to articulate the central claims of catholic Trinitarian orthodoxy that Turretin himself defends, including the consubstantiality of the divine persons, their real personal distinction, the inseparability of their operations, and the unity of the divine essence. In sum, as Fesko comments, Reformed Orthodox theologians like Turretin “stand with the catholic ecumenical tradition” either by explicitly commending the ancient councils or by employing “the credal grammar, nomenclature and metaphysics” in their theological works and confessions.⁶³

What is most relevant for the present essay, however, is that Turretin does not receive this tradition as a mere inheritance to be repeated. Rather, his aim is to show that the church’s traditional language and formulations can be grounded “more completely and explicitly on Scripture than had been done for centuries.”⁶⁴ This explains why the majority of his patristic references appear in Questions 23 and 24, where he addresses the meaning and legitimacy of theological language and the relevance of this doctrine for the Christian faith. In other words, as Muller explains, “the Reformed orthodox doctrine of the Trinity was no simple restatement of the patristic norms — rather it was a complex development of doctrine intended to recover, respect, and use the patristic definitions and arguments insofar as they could be argued anew exegetically, under the authority of the biblical norm.”⁶⁵ Thus, for Turretin, the retrieval of patristic and Nicene orthodoxy is therefore not antiquarian, but exegetical and polemical: he receives the church’s grammar in order to demonstrate that it faithfully expresses the doctrine revealed in Scripture.

Retrieval of Medieval Theology

Medieval scholastics are cited less frequently than the Fathers in Turretin’s Institutes. Nevertheless, their presence is far from insignificant.⁶⁶ As Richard Muller observes, both the Reformers and the orthodox theologians developed their teaching in dialogue not only with the Church Fathers but also with the “medieval tradition,” including “the tradition of the medieval conciliar decisions.”⁶⁷ Yet tracing specific references to medieval sources in post-Reformation theology is more difficult than tracing patristic references, since Reformed theologians were generally less inclined to cite medieval authors directly, likely because of their polemical context with the Roman Catholic Church.⁶⁸ Even so, although explicit citations are less frequent, numerous general references and substantive parallels can still be found throughout their writings.

Unlike the patristic tradition, however, the medieval scholastic tradition was received with greater selectivity. Reformed theologians tended to appropriate those elements they regarded as sound and useful for doctrinal formulation, while rejecting the speculative excesses that had developed during the medieval period.⁶⁹ Thus, as will become evident in Turretin’s theology, his engagement with medieval scholasticism reflects both appropriation and critique.

Positive Retrieval and Continuity with Nicene Orthodoxy.  

The development of Reformed and post-Reformation Trinitarian theology was deeply shaped by medieval scholasticism, particularly because of the progress made in the eleventh and twelfth centuries in “the use of philosophy and linguistic insight in the explanation of Christian doctrine.”⁷⁰ These developments became increasingly significant as the traditional categories inherited from the catholic tradition “came under increasing strain during the era of high orthodoxy, given the changes in philosophical language that characterize the second half of the seventeenth century.” As Muller explains, “Whereas the early orthodox writers could assume” the classical language they had received, “their high orthodox successors had to contend with new rationalist philosophies that embodied radically altered assumptions concerning substance, causality, and individual existence.”⁷¹

In this context, one of the central tasks facing orthodox theologians such as Turretin was to demonstrate that important elements of medieval scholasticism stood in continuity with the patristic and Nicene tradition and could therefore serve as legitimate instruments for articulating the truths revealed in Scripture. This continuity can be observed in at least three areas of Turretin’s Trinitarian theology. 

First, discussing the meaning of ousia, hypostasis, and subsistence, Turretin explicitly appeals to both Augustine and Aquinas in order to clarify the church’s received Trinitarian grammar: 

According to the testimony of Augustine, they were accustomed to say mian ousian, treis hypostasis, viz., “one essence, three subsistences” (The Trinity 5.8 [FC 45:187; PL 42.9171). But afterward, lest the ambiguity of the word might give occasion to error (as Aquinas remarks, ST, I, Q. 29, Art. 2, p. 157), the opinion of the Greeks (who use hypostasin for subsistence) obtained, and this is now the common opinion received by all.⁷²

For Turretin, Augustine provides the basic catholic formula—“one essence, three subsistences”—while Aquinas helps Turretin address the linguistic ambiguity surrounding the theological terms used.⁷³ Based on this, Turretin defends the use of the term hypostasis to protect any misinterpretation concerning the simple essence of God. Aquinas, as Meijering concludes, is presented as both a receiver and a developer of the patristic terminology, providing clarification and standardization of the distinction between essence and person without compromising divine simplicity.⁷⁴ In this way, Aquinas functions for Turretin as a clarifying witness within the broader catholic tradition, not as an independent authority over Scripture.⁷⁵  

Second, Turretin retrieves the scholastic categories of property, relation, and notion.⁷⁶ These concepts were elaborated in the scholastic tradition from the categories of Aristotle as linguistic tools to logically affirm both the unity of the divine essence and differentiation of the persons solely by their relations of origin.⁷⁷ These categories locate personal distinction in relations of origin—paternity, filiation, and spiration—rather than in essence. They also allow Turretin to distinguish notional acts, such as generation and spiration, from essential acts, such as creation and providence, which are common to the three persons.⁷⁸ In this way, medieval conceptual distinctions provide Turretin with tools for expressing the Nicene conviction that personal distinction arises from relations of origin rather than from divisions within the divine essence. 

Third, regarding the question of the distinction among the persons, Reformed and Post-Reformation theologians tended to favor a modal distinction—a position developed primarily by Aquinas and the Dominican tradition.⁷⁹ Turretin is no exception.⁸⁰ He argues that, in addressing the question of what distinguish the persons, one must avoid two opposite errors in Trinitarian theology: Sabellianism, which reduces the persons to a merely rational distinction, and Tritheism, which divides them into three eternal spirits.⁸¹ The orthodox, he maintains, “hold a middle ground,” denying that the distinction is merely rational (against Sabellius) while also denying that it is real or essential (against Tritheism). Instead, they affirm a “modal (modalem) distinction because, as the persons are constituted by personal properties as incommunicable modes of subsisting, so they may properly be said to be distinguished by them.”⁸²

This means that the personal properties by which the persons are distinguished are “certain modes by which [the divine essence] may be characterized,” not in a formal or proper sense—as though there were a difference in essence or substance—but eminently and analogically. Thus, one may affirm that there is no essential difference between the persons (“as thing and thing”), but only a modal difference (“as mode from the thing”). This distinction does not compromise the simplicity of the divine essence, since the subsistent relations among the members of the Trinity neither mix nor divide the essence.⁸³ In this sense, the medieval language of modal distinction serves the same theological goal that animated the Nicene tradition: affirming real personal distinction without introducing a plurality of essences.

This need for precision and well-defined terminology was particularly relevant in Turretin’s polemical context.⁸⁴ The new rationalist philosophies of the seventeenth century challenged traditional Trinitarian vocabulary such as substantia, altering both the understanding of classical philosophy and its application in Christian theology.⁸⁵ A retrieval of the Classic Trinitarian grammar across Patristic and Medieval eras was key to providing, in the words of Turretin, “a plainer explanation of the truth and the more complete refutation of errors.”⁸⁶ In this sense, Aquinas and medieval scholasticism offer a careful and coherent philosophical framework to articulate, through language, a proper understanding of the unity and diversity within the Trinity.⁸⁷  

Accordingly, Turretin’s engagement with medieval scholasticism should not be understood as a departure from the patristic and Nicene tradition. Rather, he appropriates selected medieval developments precisely because they furnish conceptual resources capable of preserving, clarifying, and defending the church’s classical doctrine of the Trinity under the intellectual pressures of the seventeenth century. For Turretin, this part of medieval theology was valuable not because it introduced a different doctrine of the Trinity, but because it preserved and refined conceptual distinctions already developed within the catholic and Nicene tradition. 

Critical Medieval Retrieval and the Limits of Speculation 

Reformed theologians tend to reject the speculative excesses of Trinitarian reflection, especially the more extravagant arguments found among the Church Fathers and medieval scholastics trying to explain the inner life of God.⁸⁸ As Muller has noted, Protestant scholastic methodology differs from the medieval approach because it is “less speculative” and displays a better understanding of the “truly ancillary use of philosophy in the Protestant scholastic systems.”⁸⁹ Accordingly, while Turretin appropriates various conceptual tools from medieval theology, he consistently resists those forms of speculation that attempt to move beyond what he regards as the limits of divine revelation.⁹⁰

This methodological restraint is particularly evident in Turretin’s assessment of philosophical speculation in his Trinitarian doctrine.⁹¹ Employing vivid language, he criticizes theologians who abandon the “limpid fountains of Scripture” for “stagnant pools,” and who, like “air-walkers,” attempt to penetrate mysteries beyond their reach. In their effort to descend into the “deep of deeps,” they are ultimately overwhelmed by the very majesty they seek to comprehend.⁹² Such approaches, as Turretin explains, obscure rather than clarify the doctrine of God because they pursue questions that exceed the limits of revelation.⁹³ Thus, he exhorts orthodox theologians not to engage in λεπτολογήματα(“minuscule discussions”) that contribute little to the church’s understanding of the Trinity. As Muller explains, for Reformed Orthodox theologian like Turretin “the doctrine of the Trinity is not a proper place for extensive rational demonstration and argumentation.”⁹⁴

Nowhere is this critique more evident than in his treatment of divine processions.⁹⁵ Here, Turretin insist that while the Son’s eternal generation is a revealed truth, the manner of this generation cannot “be conceived or explained by us.”⁹⁶ He says, appealing to Ambrose and Gregory Nazianzen, that “The begetting of God is to be honored by silence; the great thing is for you to learn he was begotten,” just like Isaiah 53:8 express it: “Who shall declare his generation?”⁹⁷

Accordingly, he rejects attempts to derive an adequate explanation of the Son’s generation from created analogies. No human or natural generation can adequately describe this eternal act because “they greatly differ (whether we consider the principle, the mode, or the end).”⁹⁸  For this reason, he sharply criticizes scholastic attempts to explain the mode of generation, arguing that “To no purpose do the Scholastics weary themselves in investigating and explaining the mode of this generation, since it is not only ineffable, but also incomprehensible (ἀκατάληπτος) to the angels themselves.”⁹⁹

However, regarding only the Son’s generation, he acknowledges that certain illustrations “can in some measure serve to illustrate this mystery,” especially when they possess some grounding in Scripture. Nevertheless, “they cannot set forth a full and accurate determination of the mode of this generation.”¹⁰⁰ Thus, theologians must exercise “sobriety so that, content with the fact (τῷ ὅτι) (which is clear in the Scriptures), we should not anxiously busy our thoughts with defining or even searching into the mode (which is altogether incomprehensible), but leave it to God who alone most perfectly knows Himself.”¹⁰¹ For Turretin, the proper task of theology is not to explain the mystery exhaustively but to confess faithfully what God has revealed. 

The same concern governs his treatment of the procession of the Holy Spirit. Like the generation of the Son, the Spirit’s procession is eternal and internal to the divine life.¹⁰² Yet once again Turretin insists that “the nature of this distinction cannot be explained and may more safely be unknown than inquired into.”¹⁰³ To support this conclusion, he appeals to John Damascene and Augustine as representatives of the orthodox tradition.¹⁰⁴ Turretin writes: 

I know that the Scholastics wish to derive this difference [between Father and Son] from the operation of the intellect (modum intellectus)—hence he is called the Wisdom of God; but procession [of the Holy Spirit] by way of the will (modum voluntatis)—hence he is called Love and Charity. But as this is unsupported by Scripture, so it entangles rather than explains the thing.¹⁰⁵

Thus, Turretin’s concern is not merely philosophical, but exegetical. In his judgment, Scripture does not provide a sufficiently clear foundation for identifying the Spirit’s procession with the divine will or for describing the Spirit principally as Love in the technical sense employed by the scholastics. For this reason, he rejects the psychological analogy as a suitable explanation of the Spirit’s eternal procession.

For Turretin, the idea of both intellectual and volitional procession, while it may find some suggestion in Scripture, is not sufficiently clear in divine revelation to merit such a prominent place in his theological framework.¹⁰⁶ In contrast, Turretin takes a more apophatic approach when discussing the nature of these internal processions in God, which he argues is the orthodox position developed in the catholic tradition.¹⁰⁷ Muller explains, saying that the Orthodox 

feel that dogmatic discussion of the Trinity is mandated by revelation even though the doctrine be an impenetrable mystery — and that, further, the revelation, insofar as it can be understood, must be illustrated or explicated with the tools of reason. The illustrations, however, cannot be considered any more than very limited aids to understanding: here the epistemological side of the Reformed non capax comes to the fore. . . . These analogies do not serve as proofs, given the inability of the finite creature to rise by analogy from the finite to the infinite.¹⁰⁸

Thus, Turretin’s engagement with medieval theology is marked by both continuity and restraint. He receives the conceptual achievements of the scholastic tradition where they clarify orthodox doctrine yet refuses to follow its more speculative attempts to explain the mode of the divine processions. In this respect, his retrieval is governed not by philosophical ambition but by the limits of revelation itself.

In sum, Turretin’s retrieval of medieval theology is governed by the same principle that shapes his entire theological method: the supremacy of divine revelation. He receives medieval distinctions when they clarify and defend the catholic doctrine of the Trinity but resists speculative constructions that attempt to explain the mode of the divine processions. Thus, his engagement with medieval scholasticism is neither a rejection nor an uncritical appropriation, but a selective retrieval ordered to the service of Scripture and the preservation of orthodox Trinitarian doctrine.

Conclusion

In this study, I have argued that Turretin’s doctrine of the Trinity exemplifies a distinctly Reformed pattern of theological retrieval and serves as a model for understanding the complexities of how Reformed Orthodoxy engaged the catholic tradition. Modern labels such as “Reformed Thomist” or “Calvinist Thomist,” while useful for identifying important lines of influence, are insufficient to describe the complexity of Turretin’s Trinitarian method. Turretin neither reproduces Augustine nor follows Aquinas uncritically. Instead, he engages the broad catholic tradition as a theological resource to be tested, appropriated, refined, and, when necessary, corrected by Scripture. His criticism of the psychological analogy illustrates this former point clearly. Although recognizing its illustrative value, he rejects its prominent explanatory role regarding the divine processions because he judges that Scripture does not provide a sufficiently clear foundation for such claims. In this respect, Turretin is willing to depart from the most influential voices in the Western tradition whenever he believes their conclusions exceed the limits of biblical revelation. Turretin exemplifies what Stephen Wellum identifies as the proper ordering of retrieval theology: Scripture remains the church’s final authority and “epistemological ground and warrant,” while historical theology serves a “vital ministerial role.”¹⁰⁹

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Footnotes

1. Gavin Ortlund, Theological Retrieval for Evangelicals: Why We Need Our Past to Have a Future (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2019); Michael Allen and Scott R. Swain, Reformed Catholicity: The Promise of Retrieval for Theology and Biblical Interpretation (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2015); Matthew Barrett, The Reformation as Renewal: Retrieving the One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Academic, 2023); Craig A. Carter, “The Great Tradition Retrieval Project,” Credo Magazine 9, no. 2 (2019), https://credomag.com/article/the-great-tradition-retrieval-project/. ↩︎
2. Barrett, The Reformation as Renewal, 14; Matthew Barrett, ed., On Classical Trinitarianism: Retrieving the Nicene Doctrine of the Triune God (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2024). ↩︎
3. Barrett, The Reformation as Renewal, 201.  ↩︎
4. Probably the most important work in the field is the three volumes of Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics by Richard Muller. Richard A. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics: The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, ca. 1520 to ca. 1725, 3 vols, 2nd ed (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003). ↩︎
5. Willem J. Van Asselt, “Reformed Orthodoxy: A short history of research,” in A Companion of Reformed Orthodoxy, ed. Herman J. Selderhuis. m (Leiden: Brill, 2013),18. For a brief review of the methodology for dealing with developments and continuities, see Muller, PRRD, 1:44-46. Other authors from the Utrecht school have suggested something similar, see Maarten Wisse, “Reformed Theology in Scholastic Development,” in The Oxford Handbook of Reformed Theology (Oxford, 2020), 62; Van Asselt, “Reformed Orthodoxy,” 17. ↩︎
6. Barrett, The Reformation as Renewal, 181, 200. For a classic example of the complexity involved in such labels, see John Patrick Donnelly, “Calvinist Thomism,” Viator 7 (1976): 441–455. Donnelly argues that Peter Martyr Vermigli “disagrees with Saint Thomas nearly as often as he explicitly adopts his teaching,” even while exhibiting a strong Thomistic substratum in his theology, and he similarly presents Jerome Zanchi as a theologian whose Calvinism and Thomism cannot be reduced to a simple category. Rather than treating these labels as fixed identities, Donnelly’s study highlights the dynamic and selective appropriation of medieval sources within Reformed orthodoxy. “Calvinist Thomism,” 443. ↩︎
7. All the quotations of Turretin’s work are from the work edited by James T. Dennison. Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 3 vols, trans. George Musgrave, ed. James T. Dennison, Jr. (New Jersey: P&R Publishing, 1994). When quoting Greek and Latin, I consulted Francisco Turrettino, Institutio Theologiae Elencticae. Vol 1 (Geneva: Samuel de Tournes, 1679). From now, Inst. ↩︎
8. For a deeper treatise on the psychological analogy of the Trinity in Francis Turretin and Reformed tradition, see my forthcoming article: Roberto A. Martinez, “The Reception of the Psychological Analogy of the Trinity in Reformed Theology: Augustine, Late Medieval Scholasticism, and Francis Turretin,” the Southern Baptist Journal of Theology 30.1 (Spring 2026). ↩︎
9. For a detailed account of Turretin’s scholarship, see Nicholas A. Cumming, Francis Turretin (1623–87) and the Reformed Tradition (Leiden: Brill, 2020), 6-10; J. Mark Beach, Christ and the Covenant: Francis Turretin’s Federal Theology as a Defense of the Doctrine of Grace, Reformed Historical Theology, v. 1 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007), 67-73. ↩︎
10. Turretin belongs to the period of High Orthodoxy (ca. 1640-1725), which, according to Muller’s explanation, is characterized by a greater theological synthesis and a more codified approach to defending Reformed doctrine. This period intensifies polemics against doctrinal adversaries, addresses internal controversies like Amyraldianism, and expands debates on the Trinity with the Socinians. It also features a more explicit understanding of theological tradition, including contributions from the Middle Ages. Muller, PRRD, 1:31-32. ↩︎
11. Jean-Etienne Cellérier, L’académie de Genève: Esquisse d’une histoire abrégée de l’Académie (Paris: Imprimerie de ch. Meyrueis, 1855), 18; Cumming, Francis Turretin (1623–87) and the Reformed Tradition, 27-28, 47; Dennison, “The Life and Career of Francis Turretin”, 640-641, 645; Ole Peter Grell, Brethren in Christ: A Calvinist Network in Reformation Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 252.  ↩︎
12. Mark J. Beach, “Francis Turretin’s Institutes of Elenctic Theology,” In The Oxford Handbook of Reformed Theology, 1st edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 281. The Institutio was published in several editions. It was reprinted between 1680 and 1688, with minor corrections and expansions made between 1682 and 1688. Soon after, the same publisher republished it in 1688, 1689, and 1690. In 1696, the Institutio was issued again in three volumes, now including, for the first time, Benedict Pictet’s “Funeral Oration.” J Mark Beach, “Reading Turretin: Some Observations on Francis Turretin’s Institutes of Elenctic Theology,” Mid-America Journal of Theology 27 (2016): 67. For a detailed account of this publication history, see Cumming, Francis Turretin (1623–87) and the Reformed Tradition, 133-141. ↩︎
13. Beach, “Reading Turretin,” 67.  ↩︎
14. Turretin, Preface, XXXIX-XI; Beach, “Francis Turretin’s Institutes of Elenctic Theology,” 283. ↩︎
15. While much of Europe was devastated by the war against Catholicism, Geneva enjoyed peace and liberty, which Turretin regarded as “pure blessings of God.” Turretin, “Turretin’s Dedication,” xxxiii. ↩︎
16. Turretin, “Turretin’s Dedication,” xxxiii. ↩︎
17. Turretin, “Turretin’s Dedication,” xxxiv. ↩︎
18. Turretin, “Turretin’s Dedication,” xxxvi. ↩︎
19. Turretin, “Turretin’s Dedication,” xxxv-xxxvi. ↩︎
20. Turretin, “Turretin’s Dedication,” xxxvi. ↩︎
21. In Ad fontes argumentorum, Mullers asserts that “Reformed orthodoxy was, after all, a living movement reflective of its own contexts and not merely a carbon copy of the thought of the Reformers: but what we can declare, with some confidence, is that the developing tradition of Reformed theology in the seventeenth century paid close attention to its roots in the Reformation and was concerned as it encountered new adversaries and new problems.” Richard A. Muller, After Calvin: Studies in the Development of a Theological Tradition, Oxford Studies in Historical Theology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 53; Muller, PRRD, 1:34, 59. ↩︎
22. Turretin, “Turretin’s Preface to the Reader,” xl. Among his main adversaries in his context were Roman Catholics, Socinians, and Remonstrants. Beach, “Francis Turretin’s Institutes of Elenctic Theology,” 287. ↩︎
23. Beach, “Francis Turretin’s Institutes of Elenctic Theology,” 282; Willem J. van Asselt, J. Martin Bac, and Roelf T. te Velde, “Beyond Indifference: An Elenctic Locus on Free Choice by Francesco Turrettini (1623-1687),” in Reformed Thought on Freedom: The Concept of Free Choice in Early Modern Reformed Theology, Texts and Studies in Reformation and Post-Reformation Thought (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2010), 171. ↩︎
24. Cumming, Francis Turretin (1623–87) and the Reformed Tradition, 70.  ↩︎
25. Richard A. Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology, 2nd edition (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2017), 234; Turretin, Inst. 1. 8. II, VII; 1. 9. III. ↩︎
26. Turretin, “Turretin’s Preface to the Reader,” xlii.  ↩︎
27. Regarding the doctrine of the Trinity specifically, Muller affirms that the seventeenth-century orthodox formulation was shaped through ongoing polemic against antitrinitarian positions, which stemmed from extreme biblicism. Most of them rejected the tradition because of their own exegesis of the Scripture. PRRD, 4:19, 37, 79.  ↩︎
28. Turretin, “Turretin’s Preface to the Reader,” xlii. Turretin explicitly says that forgetting the Christian thinkers from the past is detrimental to the church. He laments that such giants from the Christian past “are indeed rejected” and that “novel doctrines are introduced into the church as if those who preceded us lived in a fog and in shadows until now” (xlii). James T. Dennison Jr. points out that Turretin cited more than 3,200 quotations from classical, patristic, medieval, Jewish, Socinian, Lutheran, Arminian, Anabaptist, and Reformed authors. ↩︎
29. Cumming, Francis Turretin (1623–87) and the Reformed Tradition, 91-92; Richard A. Muller, Christ and the Decree: Christology and Predestination in Reformed Theology from Calvin to Perkins, Studies in Historical Theology 2 (Durham, N.C.: Labyrinth Press, 1986), 12. ↩︎
30. For more on the use of reason and philosophy, specifically in the work of Turretin, see Steven J. Duby, “Receiving No Perfection from Another: Francis Turretin on Divine Simplicity,” Modern Theology 35, no. 3 (July 2019): 524-526. ↩︎
31. Turretin, Inst. 1.8. II-IV. ↩︎
32. Turretin, Inst. 1.8. II, VII; 1.9. III.  ↩︎
33. Turretin, Inst. 1.8. VI. As Duby mentions, as a gift from God, reason is empowered to explain and illuminate what Scripture reveals by unpacking the implications and conclusions of divine truth. Duby proves that the proper use of reason is derived from Scripture and, in the praxis, serves to “evaluate whether theological claims align with biblical truth and adhere to the universal principles of reason, particularly the law of non-contradiction. Reason does not pass judgment on Scripture itself, but rather, as Turretin describes, it judges interpretations and theological developments through what he calls a ‘dianoetic judgment.’” Duby, “Receiving No Perfection from Another,” 525. See, for example, in Turretin, Inst. 1.8.III, VI, VII, XI-XIV, XXVII-XXX; 1.9.IV, XIII, XXXIV-XXXV; 1.10.I-II, IV, VI, VIII, XVI, XXXVI-XXXIX. ↩︎
34. Regarding this, Turretin enumerates four ways of abuse of philosophy in the exercise of theology: (1) Philosophy should not attempt to explain or understand “the mysteries of theology,” as these are beyond the domain of “natural causes”; (2) “False dogmas” under the pretext of philosophy, such as the eternity of the world in Aristotle – should not be used to interpret Scripture; (3) Philosophy should never assume the role of “master in articles of faith” – “as was done by the Scholastics who placed Aristotle upon the throne”; (4) Philosophy should not introduce “more new distinctions and phrases than necessary,” as they may lead to dangerous errors that could deviate from the truth.” Turretin, Inst. 1.13. VI. ↩︎
35. Muller, Christ and the Decree, 12.  ↩︎
36. Duby, “Receiving No Perfection from Another,” 525. Turretin denounces both the equating of theology with philosophy (mainly Socinians) and the opposition to its use (Anabaptists and Weigelians). Turretin, Institutio, 1.13. I.  ↩︎
37. Turretin, Inst. 1.13. I; 12. XIII. For a further analysis of this claim, see Sebastian Rehnman, “Alleged Rationalism: Francis Turretin on Reason,” Calvin Theological Journal 37, no. 2 (November 2002): 260-262. Klauber and Muller noted that philosophical reasoning played a crucial role in codifying doctrine because it helped clarify and respond to complex elements of Scripture, presenting Protestant dogma as a coherent and systematic whole. Martin I. Klauber, “Use of Philosophy in the Theology of Johannes Maccovius (1578-1644),” Calvin Theological Journal 30, no. 2 (November 1, 1995): 383-384; Muller, Christ and the Decree, 12. Additionally, Rehnman has argued that Turretin used metaphysical and logical categories for his formulation of the doctrine of God, proving that philosophy is used as a source, under the authority of the Scripture, that serves the correct approach to the knowledge of God. “Theistic Metaphysics and Biblical Exegesis: Francis Turretin on the Concept of God,” Religious Studies 38, no. 2 (June 2002): 167-186. 167-186. ↩︎
38. Beach, “Reading Turretin”, 70-71.   ↩︎
39. As Muller points out, this development was crucial for formalizing Reformed doctrine, establishing it independently of Rome while still being connected to the broader catholic tradition. Muller, Christ and the Decree, 12-13. Additionally, Muller has noted that “sense of the relationship between the sacra doctrina, or sacred teaching, in Scripture and the task of doctrinal formulation that consistently asked the exegetical question of the precise, literal meaning of the text, but did so in the context of the broader scope of books in Scripture and of the Bible as a whole and a concept of the analogy of faith.” Muller, PRRD, 4:89. ↩︎
40. Scholasticism, as Richard Muller argues, was not centered on a particular philosophical content but on the form of expressing theology (method). Muller, After Calvin, 4, 27. Therefore, as Muller highlights, the Reformed scholasticism of the seventeenth century was not simply a replication of the medieval model. The Reformed theologians deliberately distinguished their scholasticism from that of the medieval doctors, incorporating modifications influenced by the Renaissance and Reformation. PRRD, 1:196. ↩︎
41. Cumming, Francis Turretin (1623–87) and the Reformed Tradition, 36. Richard Muller affirms that Hoornbeeck was a specialist in the polemical task, which may be relevant in consolidating the eclectic method of Turretin’s theology. After Calvin, 110. De Budé adds that Anna van Schurman was “the friend of the philosopher Descartes, this learned young woman nicknamed the tenth muse, who without a doubt reached the highest degree of culture ever attained by a woman in this century.” Vie De François Turrettini, 29-30. ↩︎
42. Muller, After Calvin, 32; In this regard, Beach affirms: “Because many of the opponents of the Reformed confessional consensus—the most formidable being Roman Catholic antagonists—attacked that consensus using the scholastic method, the best way to meet this challenge was by employing the same theological weapon, i.e. the method of ‘school theology’ or scholasticism.” Beach, “Francis Turretin’s Institutes of Elenctic Theology,” 281, 284. Turretin’s scholastic method generally follows a clear disputational pattern: 1) he delimits the disputed question; (2) he identifies his adversaries and summarizes their position; (3) he clarifies the precise point at issue and explains its theological significance; (4) he defines the relevant terms in order to avoid misunderstanding; (5) and only then does he present the arguments for his own position while refuting opposing views; (6) the subsequent “sources of explanation” usually provide further biblical evidence, answer objections, clarify disputed points, and summarize his position. Beach, “Reading Turretin,” 70-71.  ↩︎
43. Cumming, Francis Turretin (1623–87) and the Reformed Tradition, 100. For a more detailed analysis on the use of scholasticism in Turretin, see Cumming, 99-101 and Muller, PRRD 1:194-197. ↩︎
44. Turretin, Inst. 1.4.XXI; 1.5.IV; 1.7.I.  ↩︎
45. Cumming, Francis Turretin (1623–87) and the Reformed Tradition, 100.  ↩︎
46. Cumming, Francis Turretin (1623–87) and the Reformed Tradition, 101. Turretin accuses the scholastics of improperly elevating philosophy, “enthroning Aristotle and other philosophers” instead of the prophets and apostles. Turretin, Inst. 1.10. I, VI. ↩︎
47. Turretin, Inst. 3. 23. I. ↩︎
48. Turretin and the Reformers “could [not] simply reiterate the tradition — rather, they saw the need to explain the doctrine of the Trinity in biblical and exegetical terms and to rely on the terms and formulae of the fathers and the councils only as secondary supports of the doctrine.” Muller, PRRD, 4:19; see also PRRD, 4:72, 196. ↩︎
49. Muller, PRRD, 4:405-406, 216-217. Turretin had formal training in biblical languages, and this part of Turretin’s theology contains more than fifty references to the original languages.  ↩︎
50. Turretin, Inst. 3:25. IX; 3:29. XII. ↩︎
51. Muller, PRRD, 2:129–130. ↩︎
52. Muller, PRRD, 4:62 ↩︎
53. Turretin extensively interacts with Augustine, Hilary, Gregory of Nazianzus, Basil, and Athanasius, among others, and shows that his objective in using the traditional theological language is simply to defend the purity of the doctrine of the Trinity, as it has been revealed in Scripture. Muller, PRRD, 4:392. ↩︎
54. Turretin, Inst. 2:25. I ↩︎
55. Turretin, Inst. 2:25. V ↩︎
56. Turretin, Inst. 2:25. V, XVII ↩︎
57. As Fesko observes, “Turretin follows the old paths and affirms the classic elements of the doctrine.” J. V. Fesko, “Creedal Critics or Creedal Confessors? The Reformers and the Reformed Scholastics,” in On Classical Trinitarianism: Retrieving the Nicene Doctrine of the Triune God, ed. Matthew Barrett (Downers Grove, Illinois: IVP Academic, 2024), 160. ↩︎
58. Turretin, Inst. 3:23. IV, VI, VIII, XVIII, XXI, XXIV; 3:24. IV, XIV, XX, XXI; 3:29. III; 3:29. XXI; 3:30. XII; 3:31. III. Turretin also engages directly with the writings of Arius and Episcopius, demonstrating his awareness of both ancient and contemporary theological opponents. Inst. 3:23. XVI, XX; 3:24. XIX. ↩︎
59. Turretin, Inst. 3:23. VI, X, XXVIII; 3:24. XII, XIV; 3:28. XVII; 3:31. IV. Fesko argues that the Reformers and Reformed scholastics were both “creedal confessors” of the “catholic doctrine of the Trinity.” “Creedal Critics or Creedal Confessors? The Reformers and the Reformed Scholastics,” 151. ↩︎
60. Turretin, Inst. 3.23. I-XIII ↩︎
61. Turretin, Inst. 3.23. XVIII. As Fesko explains, for Turretin, this language serves to “illuminate and elucidate” what has been revealed in the Bible. “Creedal Critics or Creedal Confessors? The Reformers and the Reformed Scholastics,” 160. ↩︎
62. Turretin, Inst. 3.23. XVII ↩︎
63. Fesko, “Creedal Critics or Creedal Confessors? The Reformers and the Reformed Scholastics,” 167. ↩︎
64. Muller, PRRD, 4:21. ↩︎
65. Muller, PRDD, 4:22. ↩︎
66. As E. P. Meijering has shown, Thomas Aquinas is the most frequently cited scholastic author—much as Jerome is among the Fathers—followed by Peter Lombard. Turretin also cites Durandus, Gabriel Biel, Bernard of Clairvaux, Bonaventure, Scotus, Hugh of Saint Victor, Peter of Ailly, Gerson, Ockham, and Anselm. E. P. Meijering, Reformierte Scholastik und patristische Theologie: die Bedeutung des Väterbeweises in der Institutio theologiae elencticae F. Turrettins: unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Gotteslehre und Christologie. Bibliotheca humanistica & reformatorica, v. 50 (Nieuwkoop: De Graaf, 1991), 34-35. ↩︎
67. Muller, PRDD, 4:18. ↩︎
68. Muller, PRRD, 1:185. ↩︎
69. Muller, PRDD, 4:73.  ↩︎
70. Muller, PRDD, 4:20. ↩︎
71. Muller, PRDD, 4:61. ↩︎
72. Turretin, Inst. 3.23.VI. ↩︎
73. In his Summa Theologica, Aquinas explains that, although the terms persona and subsistentia refer to distinctions within the Trinity, it is preferable to use substantia instead of subsistentia because it helps avoid the confusion caused by the dual meaning in Greek and Latin. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, Q. 29, Art. 2. ↩︎
74. Meijering, Reformierte Scholastik und patristische Theologie, 132.  ↩︎
75. Muller, PRRD, 1:145; 4:22.  ↩︎
76. Muller, PRRD, 4:187. ↩︎
77. Muller, PRRD, 4:187. ↩︎
78. Turretin, Inst. 3.23.XV. ↩︎
79. Muller, PRDD, 4:192–193. ↩︎
80. For a longer treatise on this, see Muller, PRDD, 4:192-194.  ↩︎
81. Turretin, Inst. 3.27.IX. ↩︎
82. Turretin, Inst. 3.27.X. ↩︎
83. Turretin, Inst. 3.27. IV. When speaking of God’s power and wisdom, it can be said that these attributes belong to the divine essence. Yet, their expression is unique to each person, manifested through their particular mode of subsistence (paternal, filial, aspirational). Turretin, Inst. 3.27. VII. ↩︎
84. Turretin, Institutio, 3.23. XVI-XVII. Thus, employing precise etymological and philosophical analysis of these terms helps safeguard the purity and mystery of the Triune God. Muller, PRRD, 4:86. ↩︎
85. Muller, PRRD, 4:61-62, 99, 171, 173. ↩︎
86. Turretin, Inst. 3.23. II. ↩︎
87. Muller, PRRD, 4:20. ↩︎
88. Muller, PRDD, 4:21, 73.  ↩︎
89. Muller, PRRD, 1:194.  ↩︎
90. I think Turretin is especially critical of this excess in the Franciscan and Emanationist tradition regarding the nature of divine processions. ↩︎
91. For Turretin, philosophy should not attempt to explain or understand “the mysteries of theology” or enter further than its domain allows. (1) Philosophy should not attempt to explain or understand “the mysteries of theology” (2) “False dogmas” under the pretext of philosophy should not be used to interpret Scripture; (3) Philosophy should never assume the role of “master in articles of faith”; (4) and philosophy should not introduce unnecessary concepts. Turretin, Inst. 1.13.VI. ↩︎
92. Turretin, Inst. 3.25.VI. ↩︎
93. Turretin, Inst. 3.24.XVI. ↩︎
94. Muller, PRRD, 4:146. ↩︎
95. In my forthcoming article “I argue that Turretin receives the psychological analogy in a strictly limited and non-determinative manner. He retains its illustrative value for the generation of the Son, yet rejects its extension to the Spirit’s procession because it exceeds the warrant of Scripture. In doing so, Turretin aligns with a broadly Thomistic metaphysics, resisting stronger medieval uses that grant the analogy more explanatory force. Thus, his approach constitutes a distinctly Reformed retrieval of the Augustinian–Thomistic tradition: he preserves the analogy’s pedagogical function and deliberately restricts its doctrinal scope within Trinitarian theology.” Martinez, “The Reception of the Psychological Analogy of the Trinity in Reformed Theology.” ↩︎
96. Turretin, Inst. 3.29.III. ↩︎
97. Turretin, Inst. 3.29.III. ↩︎
98. Turretin, Inst. 3.29.IV-V. Positively, what can be affirmed about this generation is that there is a communication of essence, which the Son himself possesses indivisibly and perfectly. The begotten Son, “(although distinct) still is never divided from Him. He is not only of a like (ὁμοιούσιος), but also of the same essence (ὁμοούσιος).” His begottenness is from all eternity, that is, without time (ἄχρονος), place (ἀχωρίστως), or passion (ἀπαθῶς).^[1] In other words, “The Father begat the Son as neither now existing (because He would be supposed to have been already before), nor as not yet existing (for so He would not be eternal), but coexisting (because He was with the Father from eternity). ↩︎
99. Turretin, Inst. 3.29.XXX. ↩︎
100. Turretin, Inst. 3.29.XXXI. ↩︎
101. Turretin, Inst. 3.29.XXXI. ↩︎
102. Turretin, Inst. 3.31.I. ↩︎
103. Turretin, Inst. 3.31.III. ↩︎
104. Muller says that: “The Reformed orthodox, however, typically take the path of the later fathers as opposed to that of the medieval scholastics: they recognize that there is a difference but refrain from speculation concerning the nature of the difference between the procession of the Spirit and the generation of the Son.” PRRD, 4:372. ↩︎
105. Turretin, Inst. 3.31.III. ↩︎
106. In my view, this is one of the most significant differences between Turretin and Aquinas. Aquinas develops the psychological analogy more fully and assigns it a prominent explanatory role within his Trinitarian theology, arguably even beyond Augustine. Turretin, by contrast, makes use of the analogy with far greater restraint. He does not reject it outright, but he refuses to grant it the same doctrinal weight or to allow it to function as a central framework for explaining the mystery of the Trinity. This difference reflects Turretin’s broader caution regarding the limits of human reason and analogy in speaking of divine processions. Martinez, “The Reception of the Psychological Analogy of the Trinity in Reformed Theology.” ↩︎
107. Muller, PRRD, 4:376. I think Turretin directly rejects the nominalist and minimalist tendencies associated with William of Ockham. Consequently, the stronger criticisms in this section is directed against emanationist tendencies, that used the analogy with the possibility of a quasi-univocal knowledge of the God’s inner life. Martinez, “The Reception of the Psychological Analogy of the Trinity in Reformed Theology.” ↩︎
108. Muller, PRRD, 4:153, 158, 376. Muller affirms that we do not have to read this criticism as any angry polemic – easily recognized in Turretin’s description of his opponents. In contrast, perhaps we see a gentle critic from the recognition that “some of their Reformed predecessors had adopted the medieval solutions on this point.” ↩︎
109. Stephen J. Wellum, “Editorial: Reflections on Retrieval and the Doing of Theology,” Southern Baptist Journal of Theology 23, no. 2 (2019), 4. ↩︎